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ABSTRACT  
We assess the investor base impact on government borrowing costs and examine how 
investors react to shocks in sovereign bond yields, across 24 countries and 3 maturities 
between 2004Q1-2019Q2. Our VAR approach has the advantage of modelling bi-
directional causality between yields and investor base. We find that higher foreign 
holdings are associated with lower yields but link these effects exclusively to foreign 
banks and mainly to 10-years maturity. Yields in GIIPS and EA core countries react in 
opposite directions to foreign holdings shocks. Foreign investment is procyclical, namely 
at the long end and where fundamentals are weaker. Thus, an EA sovereign debt crisis 
re-run cannot be dismissed requiring readiness to use supporting mechanisms to 
prevent contagion and an escalation that may jeopardize the monetary union itself. 
Yields’ response to domestic investment shocks is heterogeneous and seems to bear no 
significant relation with home bias. No cyclical trading pattern can be clearly associated 











                                                        
1 ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, Universidade de Lisboa; REM/UECE. R. Miguel Lupi 
20, 1249-078 Lisbon, Portugal. Email : cpferreira@phd.iseg.ulisboa.pt; cferreira@iseg.ulisboa.pt. 




In advanced economies (AE), fiscal support to mitigate the economic downturn and job 
losses brought about by the Covid-19 pandemic is estimated at 6 percent of GDP in 2021 
(IMF, 2021). In 2020, average budget deficits reached 11.7 percent in AE. Gross 
government debt is expected to reach a staggering 122.5 percent of GDP in 2021. Klaus 
Reading, ESM Managing Director, in a speech at the 2021 EIB Annual Economics 
Conference, tops these already high debt levels with the long-term costs of ageing and 
climate change. Furthermore, as corporate and household borrowers struggle to pay 
their loans due to the Covid-19 pandemic, potential bailout costs of banks’ hit by non-
performing loans cannot be entirely dismissed. 
Although government bond yields have remained subdued, benefiting from a downward 
trend in market interest rates and supportive government bond purchases by central 
banks, high debt levels and the unusually uncertain fiscal outlook leave the sovereign 
bond market vulnerable to changes in investors’ beliefs regarding debt sustainability. 
In the specific case of the Euro Area (EA), the lack of national control over monetary 
policy leaves sovereigns more exposed to default risk. Moreover, common financial 
vulnerabilities to external shocks risk contagion effects (Calvo, et al., 2004). These 
factors combined represent a threat to the monetary union itself. 
As was shown by the EA sovereign debt crisis, not all government debt investors react 
likewise to the same shock. Hence, a better understanding of behavioural responses of 
different types of investors is helpful to improve public debt risk management, macro-
prudential policy decision-making and the operational design of fall-back mechanisms 
and collateral polices. 
This paper has an empirical focus. More than five years after the EA sovereign debt crisis, 
we build on the empirical literature and make use of the most recent IMF data to assess 
the investor base impact on government borrowing costs and examine how investors 
react to shocks in sovereign bond yields.  
The novelty of our VAR approach lies in the explicit recognition of bi-directional causality 
between yields and investor base and the interactions of the different types of investors. 
We also extend the assessment of relationships to 5- and 2-years yields on top of the 
more common appraisal for the 10-years benchmark yield. Furthermore, by treating 
individually 24 advanced economies, we provide a distributional view of responses to 
shocks, adding to the group evidence given by a panel VAR approach.   
Panel econometric results confirm previous findings that higher foreign holdings are 
associated with lower long-term yields (Andritzky, 2012; Arslanalp & Poghoysan, 2014; 
Manna & Nobili, 2018), but link these effects exclusively to foreign banks and to 10-years 
yields or, 10- and 5-years yields in the EA specific case. When negative, yields’ responses 
seem to be stronger when yield levels are higher. Differently from other geographies, 
foreign investors in the EA treat government debt as a risky asset. Yields in GIIPS2 and 
                                                        
2 Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. 
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core countries react in opposite directions to shocks in foreign holdings. Foreign 
investment is procyclical, namely at the long end and where fundamentals are weaker. 
The combination of these ingredients means an EA sovereign debt crisis re-run cannot 
be dismissed, requiring readiness to use supporting mechanisms to prevent contagion 
and an escalation that may jeopardize the monetary union itself. 
Yields response to domestic investors holdings is heterogeneous across geographies. At 
panel level, only our third panel of 8 countries3 that did not experience unconventional 
monetary policy bond purchases supports the findings of Andritzy (2012) and Jaramillo 
& Zhang (2013) that lower yields are associated with higher domestic non-bank holdings’ 
share. On the other hand, this same panel is the only one that does not support Manna 
& Nobili (2018)4 association of higher domestic banks’ share with lower yields. Country-
level results point to a majority of positive responses by domestic investors. No cyclical 
trading pattern can be clearly associated to each type of non-official domestic investor. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature. Section 3 introduces the data on government debt holdings and some 
descriptive statistics. Sections 4 and 5 detail our modelling and econometric approach, 
respectively. Section 6 presents panel VAR and country-by-country VAR results. 
Conclusions are drawn in Section 7.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Investor Base and Borrowing Costs 
The relevance of the dynamics of the investor base draws support from the work in 
preferred-habitat theory pioneered by Culbertson (1957) and Modigliani and Sutch 
(1966). Vayanos & Vila (2009) show that specific clientele shocks have the potential to 
affect the term structure of interest rates by assuming that arbitrageurs, being exposed 
to fundamental (change in short-term rates) and non-fundamental risks (shocks to 
demand of preferred-habitat players) have a limited risk tolerance. Kaminska et al. (2011) 
use the same model to explain the steep fall of US long-term interest rates since 2000 
on the interaction of the demand of such preferred-habitat investors as foreign central 
banks and risk sensitive arbitrageurs. Under this framework and the assumption that the 
set of substitutable assets exhibit different risk levels and investors face different market 
frictions5, shifts in the composition of a heterogeneous investor base have an impact on 
prices. The empirical papers of Andritzky (2012), Jaramillo & Zhang (2013) and Manna & 
                                                        
3 Australia, Canada, Czechia, Denmark, Korea, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland. Switzerland is here an 
exception in the sense that quantitative easing was indeed pursued but by expanding banks sight deposits 
(from CHF 30 billion to CHF 200 billion, successively announced at 3, 10 and 17 of August 2011) and not 
through government bond purchases. 
4 The relation holds only in the long-run since in the short-run equation of the ECM the relation is not 
statistically significant. Orpiszewski (2015) also finds a negative relation in regressions with yield levels 
but not when first differences are used. 
5 See for example Burger et al. (2015) or Lane (2005) on factors affecting international capital allocation. 
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Nobili (2018)6  build on the previous theoretical results regarding the investor base 
impact on yields.  
Arslanalp & Tsuda (2014a) and Arslanalp & Poghosyan (2014) empirical work have a 
perspective closer to the literature on capital flows and the theory of financial 
disequilibrium that relates deviations from fundamental values with the flow of funds. 
The former authors support their view on the impact of the investor structure on 
government borrowing costs on the short-term inelasticity of supply: “in the short run, 
the supply of sovereign debt is set by the government and, therefore, the price (or 
inversely yield) of debt is set primarily by demand through auctions and other means. 
Hence, as new investors, such as foreign or institutional investors, join the investor base, 
demand for government debt can increase (either at the auction or the secondary 
market) and the government’s borrowing costs can decline” (Arslanalp & Tsuda, 2014a). 
Those views agree with several other authors that see in demand the “short” side of the 
market and echoes the model of Fernández-Arias & Montiel (1996) for emerging 
markets’ debt. 
FitzGerald & Krolzig (2005) give supply a dynamic that is absent in the previous view. 
They see “supply” as describing the characteristics or quality (rating, debt levels, growth 
rates …) of sovereign bonds and demand as a function of return and risk variables of 
foreign investors’ home-country. This perspective highlights the need to estimate jointly 
demand and supply, as original demand and supply parameters cannot be extracted 
from reduced form estimates, instead of the more common approach in the literature 
of estimating a reduced form “demand function”. This general specification of demand 
fits well with the prevailing literature consensus on the importance of the cross-border 
spill over effects of US monetary policy (Lim et al., 2014; Bhattarai et al., 2015; Bowman 
et al., 2015; Lim & Mohapatra, 2016; Chen et al., 2016)7, the supply of global liquidity 
and global risk aversion in explaining surges in capital flows. According with this 
consensus view (Ghosh et al., 2014 and Montiel & Reinhart, 1999) domestic factors only 
explain the magnitude of such episodes in each country. 
2.2 Investor Base and Refinancing Risk 
The studies on the investor base relationship with risk often focus on either foreign 
participation or on differences in investor balance-sheet structures or constraints.  
Foreign investors are more sensitive to political and macroeconomic risk factors and 
therefore exhibit less stable holdings (OECD, 2019).  Arslanalp & Tsuda (2014) relate this 
lower stability to the availability to these investors of larger pool of alternative assets 
and to sudden stops. Calvo & Talvi (2005) link sudden stops to foreign investors’ strong 
                                                        
6 Manna & Nobili (2018) also draw on (i) portfolio balance theory which explains asset demand impact on 
long-term yields by changes in the available duration in the market and typically relates to central banks 
operations and (ii) market microstructure literature suggesting investor base breakdown is not neutral.   
7 ECB asset purchases spill over effects seem to have been contained to AE with no significant impact in 
EM according with the findings of Bergant et al. (2020) and Fratzscher et al. (2016). The latter relate this 
disparity to the global role of the dollar and/or to the postcrisis decline in the relative importance of 
banking vs. bonds. 
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reaction to changes in global risk aversion. Ebeke & Kyobe (2015) show that foreign 
participation and investor concentration amplify the impact of global risk factors, 
whereas good domestic fundamentals dampen adverse global spill over effects. 
Albuquerque (2003) and Levchenko & Mauro (2006) add that sudden movements are 
an optimal response to high volatility and low persistence of foreign flows, a response 
that the risk of exchange rate fluctuations may amplify (Hau & Rey, 2004). Procyclical 
trading, herding and contagion are other mechanisms proposed in the literature, all of 
them related to informational frictions. Brennan & Cao (1997) explain return-chasing by 
the relatively higher reliance of foreign investors on public information due to an 
informational disadvantage regarding domestic investors. Gravity models (Portes et al., 
2001; Martin & Rey, 2004; Portes & Rey, 2005) support this view by showing that 
proximity drives stronger international asset flows. Herding behaviour and contagion 
(correlation of investments decisions across investors and across markets) are explained 
by a combination of payoff externalities, principal-agent problems, and informational 
cascades8. Peiris (2010), on the opposite side, quote arguments in favour of a stabilizing 
role of foreign demand put forward by Prasad & Rajan (2008) – increase in market 
liquidity and added pressure for corporate governance and institutional reform – and 
Burger et al. (2009) – reduction of currency mismatches and alternative source of 
funding when domestic investors divest. 
Intermediary pricing theory 9  focus on moral hazard frictions and on the role of 
intermediaries as marginal investors in setting equilibrium prices. He & Krishnamurthy 
(2012, 2013) show that capital shocks to the intermediaries’ wealth, namely losses that 
deplete equity capital or investor withdrawals from investment funds, impact asset 
prices in a nonlinear fashion. Losses reduce intermediaries risk tolerance prompting 
asset sales and a fall in prices, the effect being larger if their equity capital constraint 
starts binding. Thus, capital shocks can explain intermediaries procyclical behaviour. 
Shleifer & Vishny (1992) stress the role of collateral and the difference between levered 
and unlevered investors. The former being potentially forced to sell assets to respond 
to margin calls from lenders and unlevered institutional investors buying 
countercyclically distressed-sold assets in the hope of higher future returns. Adrian & 
Shin (2010, 2014) show that marked-to-market leverage is strongly procyclical.  
                                                        
8 Payoff externalities occur when payoff to an agent taking an action is positively related to the number 
of agents taking the same course of action (FitzGerald & Krolzig, 2005).  Principle-agent considerations 
arise from the design of incentive structures for institutional investors based on benchmarking against the 
market or peers to overcome monitoring problems. Thus, a manager to maintain or gain reputation when 
markets are imperfectly informed, may prefer either to ‘hide in the herd’ to avoid evaluation or ‘ride the 
herd’ to improve reputation (Frenkel & Menkhoff, 2004; Gelos, 2011; and Calvo & Mendonza, 2000; 
empirically backed by Miyajima & Shim, 2014). Informational cascades identify the case where foreign 
agents have an informational disadvantage (e.g., high gathering costs, as in Calvo & Mendonza, 2000, or 
a signal-extraction problem, as in Calvo, 1999) but can observe the actions of other investors, and 
optimally decide to infer information from their actions, and ignore their own information (Devenow & 
Welch, 1996; and Borensztein & Gelos, 2003). 
9 See Adrian & Boyarchenko (2012); Brunnermeier & Pedersen (2009); or He & Krishnamurthy (2012, 2013 
and 2018). 
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Timmer (2018) highlights insurance companies and pension funds countercyclical 
investment. The different cyclical behaviour is attributed to this sector’s more stable 
liabilities and equity prices less responsive to losses on security holdings (Chodorow-
Reich et al., 2021) which make it better equipped to withstand short-term losses and 
take advantage of falling asset prices10.   
This view, however, is not consensual. In Battistini et al. (2014 11  banks exhibit 
countercyclical investment behaviour12. Regarding insurance companies and pension 
funds, several studies (Domanski et al., 2017; Duijm & Bisschop, 2018)13 also point in a 
different direction, in this case procyclical investment behaviour.  
 
3. GENERAL GOVERNMENT DEBT HOLDINGS 
3.1 Data Description 
Quarterly data on holdings of general government gross debt by type of investor 
between 2004 Q1 and 2019 Q2 (62 quarters), for 24 advanced economies (listed in the 
Appendix A, Table A - I ), comprise the core of our data set. 
Holdings of general government gross debt are defined as the consolidated sum of 
liabilities represented by SDRs, currency and deposits, debt securities and loans, at face 
value or adjusted for valuation changes to remove price fluctuations. General 
government encompasses central government, state and local governments and social 
security funds. In consolidated figures cross holdings are netted out. The investor base 
is decomposed in six types of investors: foreign banks, foreign non-banks, foreign official 
sector, domestic banks, domestic non-banks, domestic central bank.  
Data on holdings is taken from sovereign investor base estimates by Arslanalp & Tsuda 
(2014). 
                                                        
10 However, Timmer (2018) suggests that larger negative duration gaps associated with a low interest rate 
environment may weaken this countercyclical behaviour. 
11 Yield shocks are decomposed in a common risk factor and a country risk factor. Holdings’ relation is 
mostly positive to the former. Regarding the latter, an increase in country risk prompts local banks to 
significantly reduce their domestic exposures in core countries (except Austria) and to increase it in the 
periphery (except for Spain). 
12 Through secondary markets operations (as in Broner et al., 2006; and Broner et al., 2014) banks absorb 
unwanted sovereign debt holdings of foreign investors (Cafiso, 2016), having thereby a stabilizing effect 
on refinancing risk (Lamas & Mencía, 2018; Cornand et al., 2014), and even on the conditions of their own 
balance sheet (Affinito et al., 2016). Notwithstanding, banks loading on their sovereign-debt increase the 
potential haircut for other private investors as government, central bank and banking system can be 
treated as single entity in a sovereign debt crisis (Belke & Gros, 2019) and, by crowding-out private credit, 
reduce economic growth. The increased amount of contingent liabilities associated with a potential 
bailout of their own banking system, other private investors higher losses in case of default and lower 
growth expectations, all may weigh on sovereign debt sustainability beliefs, increasing refinancing risk 
and chances of self-fulfilling crises.       
13 Investigating the equity and fixed income portfolios of Dutch non-life insurers, life insurers and pension 
funds, find evidence of procyclical behaviour by insurance companies and of countercyclical behaviour 
during market upturns for pension funds. 
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3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
3.2.1 Holdings’ Analysis  
 
Table I shows summary statistics regarding each type of investor share in general 
government debt holdings (GGDH).  
TABLE I - SHARE IN GENERAL GOVERNMENT GROSS DEBT HOLDINGS (% TOTAL) 
 
The biggest investors on general government debt are domestic non-official entities 
with slightly more than a 50% share. Foreign banks share in foreign holdings is less 
representative than the corresponding figure for domestic banks, suggesting a higher 
degree of “home bias” in banks’ investment allocation than in the case of non-banks. 
The bias is even more expressive in the EA (see Appendix B). This is likely a consequence 
of the 2010-14 sovereign debt crisis since we would expect to find lower “home bias” in 
a common currency area without significant barriers to the free flow of capital.  
Despite capital markets integration of AE, investor base heterogeneity between 
countries is high. Foreign non-official share in total holdings range from 6% to 60%, and 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Foreign Banks overall 0.074 0.068 0.001 0.413 N =    1488
between 0.055 0.005 0.187 n =      24
within 0.041 -0.055 0.309 T =      62
Foreign Non-Banks overall 0.199 0.146 0.000 0.661 N =    1488
between 0.120 0.039 0.464 n =      24
within 0.087 -0.100 0.520 T =      62
Foreign Non-Official overall 0.274 0.178 0.003 0.743 N =    1488
between 0.151 0.057 0.595 n =      24
within 0.098 -0.005 0.640 T =      62
Domestic Banks overall 0.204 0.104 0.002 0.605 N =    1488
between 0.090 0.046 0.388 n =      24
within 0.054 0.032 0.484 T =      62
Domestic Non-banks overall 0.301 0.188 0.009 0.819 N =    1488
between 0.178 0.064 0.660 n =      24
within 0.071 -0.027 0.566 T =      62
Domestic Non-Official overall 0.505 0.199 0.065 0.907 N =    1488
between 0.186 0.182 0.831 n =      24
within 0.080 0.229 0.806 T =      62
Foreign Official overall 0.165 0.140 0.016 0.820 N =    1488
between 0.110 0.029 0.435 n =      24
within 0.089 -0.234 0.550 T =      62
Domestic Central Bank overall 0.056 0.071 0.000 0.422 N =    1488
between 0.046 0.000 0.191 n =      24
within 0.055 -0.105 0.287 T =      62
Note: between = country avera ges ; within = deviations  from country average plus  global  mean
Source: Author ca lculations  on data  from Sovere ign Inves tor Ba se estimates  by Ars lanalp and Tsuda (2014)
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domestic non-official holdings’ share lies between 18% to 83%. Foreigners tend to be 
more representative investors in small markets. On the other hand, domestic investors, 
namely non-banks, tend to have higher weight in non-EA countries.   
 
FIGURE 1 - FOREIGN BANKS AVERAGE SHARE IN 
TOTAL HOLDINGS (2014 Q1-2019 Q2) 
 
FIGURE 2 - FOREIGN NON-BANKS AVERAGE SHARE IN 
TOTAL HOLDINGS (2014 Q1-2019 Q2) 
FIGURE 3 - DOMESTIC BANKS AVERAGE SHARE IN 
TOTAL HOLDINGS (2014 Q1-2019 Q2) 
FIGURE 4 - DOMESTIC NON-BANKS AVERAGE SHARE 
IN TOTAL HOLDINGS (2014 Q1-2019 Q2) 
Source: Author calculations on data from Sovereign Investor Base estimates by Arslanalp & Tsuda (2014) 
 
 
The coefficient of variation (see Source: Author calculations on data from Sovereign Investor Base estimates by 
Arslanalp & Tsuda (2014) 
Figure 5) is higher for foreign than domestic non-official GGDH shares indicating higher 
heterogeneity and/or instability.  
 




Source: Author calculations on data from Sovereign Investor Base estimates by Arslanalp & Tsuda (2014) 
FIGURE 5 - SHARE IN GG DEBT HOLDINGS - COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION 
Variance across countries is more significant than across time for every type of investor 
with the single exception of domestic central banks. This exception highlights the 
structural break nature of government bonds purchase programmes put in place by 
various central banks at the ZLB. Foreign banks exhibit the lowest ratio of “between” 
and “within” standard deviations of theirs GGDH share, which in the specific case of the 
EA is even below 1. This result suggests again important changes in foreign banks 
holdings during the EA sovereign debt crisis. It is well documented in the literature14 the 
transition from an overly optimistic view of sovereign default risk prevalent up to 2006 
to an overly pessimistic assessment of the same risk after 2008, as well as changes in 
the determinants of bond yield spread. Banks´ tighter equity capital constraints may 
explain the stronger reaction by this specific type of investors.  
Figure 6 and Figure 7 depict how the investor base has changed during the sample period. 
A distinctive shift is the increase in the share of outstanding government debt in the 
hands of the official sector.  In the U2JS panel this is offset mainly by a reduction in the 
share of domestic non-banks. In the EA, the reduction is widespread among the non-
official sector, with foreign and domestic banks losing half their share.   
                                                     
14  See for example Afonso et al. (2012), Klepsch & Wollmershäuser (2011), Schuknecht et al. (2010), 
D'Agostino & Ehrmann (2014) and Aristei & Martelli (2004). 




FIGURE 6 – INVESTOR BASE IN 2004 Q1 
 
FIGURE 7 – INVESTOR BASE IN 2019 Q2 
Source: Author calculations on data from Sovereign Investor Base estimates by Arslanalp & Tsuda (2014) 
Another important trend regards the participation of foreign investors. In Source: Author 
calculations on data from Sovereign Investor Base estimates by Arslanalp & Tsuda (2014) 
Figure 9Source: Author calculations on data from Sovereign Investor Base estimates by Arslanalp & Tsuda (2014) 
Figure 8 is possible to see a general trend towards the reduction of such participation.  
 
Source: Author calculations on data from Sovereign Investor Base estimates by Arslanalp & Tsuda (2014) 
FIGURE 8 – TRENDS IN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES FOREIGN NON-OFFICIAL SHARE IN TOTAL GGDH 
The biggest drops in foreign non-official holdings’ share occur not only in countries 
struck by the euro sovereign debt crisis like Greece (-41 p.p.) or Portugal (-30 p.p.) but 
also, in northern countries such as the Netherlands (-44 p.p.), Finland (-40 p.p.), Norway 
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The share of domestic non-banks falls in most countries, including some like Australia (-
28 p.p.), New Zealand (-17 p.p.) and Canada (-7 p.p.) that were not affected by central 
banks’ asset purchases programmes (APP).  
 
Source: Author calculations on data from Sovereign Investor Base estimates by Arslanalp & Tsuda (2014) 
FIGURE 9 - TRENDS IN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES DOMESTIC NON-BANKS SHARE IN TOTAL GGDH 
Domestic banks’ government debt holdings increased in Italy (+13 p.p.) and Portugal (+6 
p.p.) among others. Although holdings of domestic banks subsided from the peaks 
reached during the euro sovereign debt crisis, in contrast with Spain, they remained 
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Source: Author calculations on data from Sovereign Investor Base estimates by Arslanalp & Tsuda (2014) 
FIGURE 10 - TRENDS IN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES DOMESTIC BANKS SHARE IN TOTAL GGDH 
 
3.2.1 Transactions Analysis  
In this section we focus on transactions, that is net sales or net purchases computed 
from the change in holdings. Manna & Nobili (2018) classify transactions in “large” and 
“intermediate”. The former corresponds to changes in holdings that fall in the top or 
bottom 5% of the distribution of quarterly changes for all sectors in one single country. 
Intermediate changes are those that fall between the 10th and the 40th percentile as 
well as those that fall in the 60th to 90th percentile of the same distribution. Here we 
take the same approach to have comparable results, examining a larger sample15.  
TABLE II - TRANSACTIONS SIZE 
 
Our dataset has 8 784 quarterly changes in holdings of which 913 have been classified 
as large. Large transactions are conducted mainly by non-banks, both domestic and 
foreign, with a similar share of 31%. The active role of foreign non-banks is clear when 
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G r aphs by country
Banks Non-Banks Official Banks Non-Banks Central Bank
Large 7.8% 31.1% 10.4% 13.3% 31.2% 6.2% 913
Intermediate 19.3% 15.4% 17.7% 18.5% 15.8% 13.3% 5371
Avg Holdings 7.4% 19.9% 16.5% 20.4% 30.1% 5.6% -
Source: Author calculations  on data from Sovereign Investor Base estimates by Arslanalp & Tsuda (2014)
Foreign Domestic # Hld. Chg.Transactions 
Size
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we compare their large trades share with their 20% holdings share. These figures 
highlight how important this sector16 is for price setting in the public debt market and 
suggest close monitoring and appropriate communication to mitigate possible 
informational frictions. Foreign banks probably take a double role as intermediators and 
investors, having both a very high relative share of intermediate transactions and a share 
of large trades above their mean holdings share. The relative low share in both large and 
intermediate trades of domestic banks may mean they take predominantly an 
intermediary role.  
Analysing the sign of large changes in holdings by sector – see Table III – we find the 
balance of large transactions of official entities to be positive, a reflexion of both APPs 
and official assistance17. On a net basis, banks and foreign non-banks are the main 
counterparts of those operations.  
TABLE III - TRANSACTIONS SIGN 
 
In the specific case of GIIPS countries, responsible for 59% of foreign official net large 
buying activity, we come closer to the conclusions of Manna & Nobili (2018). In these 
countries, sellers were mostly foreign investors (both banks and non-banks) and, in a 
lesser degree, domestic non-banks. Domestic banks took a stabilizing role being net 
buyers along official foreign entities. 
Matching large transactions with market conditions at the same and previous quarter of 
the trades provides information on the investment style of the investor base. The 
taxonomy is summarized in Table IV and Table V details the distribution of large trades 
of the different non-official investor sectors by investment style. The analysis of the 
results reveals two noteworthy features. Firstly, foreign banks seem more prone to 
“chase returns” when buying than any other sector in the EA, a feature not observed in 
the bloc of countries outside this area - the weight of this investment style for foreign 
banks in the EA is a striking 63% against a range between 31% and 35% for other sectors 
and against 36% of foreign banks’ purchases outside the EA. Secondly, trend 
strengthening “herd behaviour”  is more frequent among EA foreign investor when 
selling then among EA domestic investors - 28-35% versus 11-17% relative frequencies 
                                                        
16 A word of caution is required, since this finding is not observed in emerging markets, and it may be the 
result of two specific factors. Firstly, the strong representation of countries of a common currency zone 
(EA) in our sample. The absence of exchange rate risk blurs the difference between foreign investors of 
the same currency area and domestic investors and fosters cross-border holdings. Secondly, the euro 
sovereign debt crisis, pending which the risks of euro area break-up and private investors bail-in entailed 
large adjustment in cross-border holdings. 
17 In Emerging Markets (EM), official entities take the opposite role, being large net sellers, during a period 
of gradual development and consolidation of the market for EM local currency sovereign debt. 
Banks Non-Banks Official Banks Non-Banks Central Bank
Decrease 41 153 34 66 143 20
Increase 30 131 61 55 142 37
Balance -11 -22 27 -11 -1 17
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– and this also holds true for EA foreign banks vis-à-vis Non-EA foreign banks – 35% vs 
20% relative frequencies. These features suggest a more procyclical foreign investment 
in the EA relatively to the rest of AE in our sample.  
TABLE IV - TAXONOMY OF INVESTMENT STYLES 
 
TABLE V - DISTRIBUTION OF NON-OFFICIAL INVESTORS LARGE TRADES BY INVESTMENT STYLES 
 
 
4. MODELLING APPROACH AND DATA  
4.1 Empirical Model and Data  
Our modelling approach acknowledges bi-directional causality between yields and 
investor base and model the simultaneous determination of both avoiding the problems 
often remarked in the literature of endogeneity and direction of causality. 
We use a general model with the following specification, 
(1) Xt = f (Xt, Zt, Ut), 





    
where ΔYt are yields’ 1st differences and Δ𝐻  are 1st differences of the log of investor 
sector j holdings. Zt is a vector of control variables used to estimate the investor base 
marginal impact. Ut is a vector of error terms.  
The model assumes that non-official investors trade in the primary and secondary 
markets to adjust debt stocks to their desired level and yields change to clear the market 
in each period. Net issuance is deemed exogenous, and we use debt-to-GDP to control 
for it. 
Source: Manna & Nobili (2018) p. 17.
ΔYt-1 > 0
ΔYt-1 < 0
ΔYt < 0 ΔYt > 0






ΔYt < 0 ΔYt > 0
Chasing Returns 
Herd Beavhiour(?)








ΔYt < 0 ΔYt > 0 ΔYt < 0 ΔYt > 0 ΔYt < 0 ΔYt > 0 ΔYt < 0 ΔYt > 0 ΔYt < 0 ΔYt > 0 ΔYt < 0 ΔYt > 0 ΔYt < 0 ΔYt > 0 ΔYt < 0 ΔYt > 0
AE
ΔYt-1 > 0 23% 17% 20% 29% 24% 22% 18% 25% 18% 25% 17% 21% 18% 24% 20% 17%
ΔYt-1 < 0 50% 10% 32% 20% 39% 15% 40% 17% 38% 20% 35% 27% 38% 20% 43% 20%
EA
ΔYt-1 > 0 25% 6% 12% 35% 28% 20% 14% 28% 20% 26% 21% 17% 19% 25% 19% 11%
ΔYt-1 < 0 63% 6% 27% 27% 35% 16% 40% 18% 34% 20% 38% 25% 31% 25% 45% 25%
NON-EA
ΔYt-1 > 0 21% 29% 33% 20% 19% 25% 21% 23% 14% 24% 14% 24% 18% 23% 20% 23%
ΔYt-1 < 0 36% 14% 40% 7% 44% 12% 40% 16% 43% 19% 33% 29% 42% 17% 41% 16%
Source: Author calculations  on data from Sovereign Investor Base estimates by Arslanalp & Tsuda (2014)
Net Sales Net Purchases Net Sales
Foreign Banks Foreign Non-Banks Domestic Banks Domestic Non-banks
Net Purchases Net Sales Net Purchases Net Sales Net Purchases
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As a rule, we will treat official holdings as weakly exogenous. Three considerations 
underly this option. First, foreign official holdings reflect not only reserve management 
considerations but also discrete decisions regarding financial assistance programs. 
Second, central bank holdings tend to be driven by specific objectives such as liquidity 
and collateral management rather than by the common drivers of non-official holdings. 
Third, to keep the model parsimonious in face of limited data availability.  
In 4 countries - US, U.K., Japan, and Sweden -   central bank holdings are “endogenized” 
to account for government bond purchases and the inclusion of bond yields in the 
central bank reaction function18. Examples of explicit modelling of central bank reaction 
function linking asset purchases to other variables are hard to find. Notwithstanding, 
insights can be found in Fratzscher et al. (2016) and Sims & Wu (2021). To address 
endogeneity issues in central banks’ reaction function, we lag or restrained to zero 
variables like short-term interest rates, inflation expectations, GDP growth, bank assets-
to-GDP, credit to non-financial corporations and households, or the balance of the 
current account-to-GDP. We do not adjust the market risk indicator (typically the VIX), 
following in this regard Beck et al. (2019), nor fiscal variables19. 
The vector of control variables Zt comprises: (i) bond yields determinants; and (ii) 
variables linked to agents’ investment decision process, like risk appetite, international 
leverage conditions, market liquidity, hedging costs and alternative investments.  
Following the existing literature, we use as baseline determinants of bond yields 
inflation expectations, short-term interest rates, an international (either German or US) 
benchmark long-term interest-rate, economic growth, a proxy for the international price 
of risk (VIX and the Option-Adjusted Spread between BBB and AAA US Corporates), the 
bid-ask spread of the 10-years benchmark bond (liquidity measure), fiscal conditions 
(ratio to GDP of budget balance, gross debt, gross debt in interaction with a gross debt 
logit transformation dummy variable 20  to account for non-linearities, and the bank 
assets to GDP ratio to capture contingent liabilities), and the external current account 
balance to GDP ratio.  
We proxy the different dimensions of the investment process with specific variables 
which, for presentational simplicity, are summarized in Table VI. 
                                                        
18 Japan explicitly included yield curve control in its monetary policy objectives in 2016. 
19 Regime switching approaches to model asset purchases by the central bank can be found in Nyberg 
(2013) and Meinusch & Tillman (2014). 
20 The dummy variable takes the value zero when the debt ratio is low relatively to the sample average 
and converges to 1 as debt ratio grows. 
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TABLE VI - EXOGENOUS VARIABLES RELATED WITH THE INVESTMENT DECISION PROCESS 
  
We use dummies to account for structural breaks and to handle data related issues. 
Further details on the variables used and their data source can be found in Appendix A,  
Table A - II, Table A - III, Table A -  IV, and Table A - V.  
Appropriate cross-sectional dependence, unit root 21  and cointegration tests (see 
Appendix B) show that yields and investor holdings series are mostly integrated of order 
one, but not cointegrated. Regarding the exogenous variables, inflation expectations, 
bid-ask spreads, nominal GDP growth rate and risk indicators are stationary in most tests.  
In face of the lack of compelling evidence supporting cointegration between yields and 
holdings in our panel countries and to ensure consistency and comparability across 
individual countries’ results, we forego pursuing the Vector Error Correction Model 
approach in favour of a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) specification.  
5. ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
Our empirical analysis uses two econometric methodologies. First, we apply a 
homogeneous Panel Data Vector Autoregressive model with exogenous variables 
(PVAR-X). The model reduced form, with k dependent variables, a p autoregressive order 
m exogenous variables and country-specific fixed effects, is given by: 
(3)  Xit = Xit−1A1 + ··· + Xit−pAp + ZitB + Ei + Uit ,  i ∈ {1, 2,...,N}, t ∈ {1, 2,...,Ti} ,  
where X
it
 is a (1×k) vector of dependent variables, Z
it
 is a (1×m) vector of exogenous 
variables, E
i
 is a (1 × k) vector of country-specific panel fixed effects; U
it
 is a (1 × k) vector 
of idiosyncratic errors. Aj (k×k) and B (m×k) are parameters matrices to be estimated. 
Innovations have the following characteristics: E(Uit) = 0, E(U’itUit) = Σ, and E(U’itUis) = 0 
for all t>s. Σ is a constant positive definite variance matrix. 
 
                                                        




International Leverage US Bank Assets to GDP ratio
Market Liquidity
10-years Benchmark Bond Bid-Ask 
Spread
3-months Money Market Interest Rate
US or German same maturity 
benchmark bonds (*)
Non-Financial Corporations and 
Households Nominal Credit Growth
Nominal Economic Growth (**)
(*) Does not apply to the US.
(**) In the US and Switzerland Share Price Return is also used
Risk Appetite
Alternative Investments
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Since country-specific fixed-effects are correlated with the regressors due to the lags of 
the endogenous variables, mean-differencing alone would result in biased estimators. 
To overcome this problem, we follow Arellano & Bover (1995) and use an Helmert 
transformation, a forward mean-differencing procedure. Estimation is carried out using 
a routine developed by Abrigo & Love (2016), building on previous work of Love & 
Zicchino (2006), that fits the model as a system of equations using interactive general 
method of moments (GMM) to benefit from the efficiency gains reported by Holtz-Eakin 
et al. (1988). Lag order selection in both PVAR-X specification and moment condition is 
conducted using Andrew & Lu (2001) method of model and moments selection criteria 
(MMSC)22, Hansen (1982) J statistic23 and, for just identified models, the coefficient of 
determination, as suggested by Abrigo & Love (2016).  The lag length of over-identified 
models that satisfy the Hansen’s overidentification criterion is based on the 
minimization of the MMSCBIC, MMSCHQIC and MMSCAIC, with particular focus in the latter 
following Ng & Perron (2001). Identification is based on a lower triangular Cholesky 
decomposition as proposed by Sims (1980). The ordering of variables always requires 
bond yields to react contemporaneously to shocks in the investor base, which makes 
yields the “most endogenous” of the dependent variables. We let the data determine 
the order among the different types of investors, using as a guide the results of Granger 
causality tests. We focus on the effect of orthogonal shocks to investor base holdings 
and to yields summed up overtime and summarized in Cumulative Orthogonal Impulse-
Response Functions (COIRF). To assess the significance of the computed COIRF, 
confidence intervals are estimated using Monte-Carlo simulations and bootstrap re-
sampling methods. 
 
Our second econometric approach allows country heterogeneity, since by construction 
the parameters of individual time-series VAR-X are country-specific. The model reduced 
form, with k dependent variables, a p autoregressive order and m exogenous variables 





A1 + ··· + Xt−pAp + ZtB + Ut ,  T ∈ {1, 2,...,TI} 
where X
t
 is a (1×k) vector of dependent variables, Z
t
 is a (1×m) vector of exogenous 
variables, U
t
 is a (1 × k) vector of idiosyncratic errors. Aj (k×k) and B (m×k) are parameters 
matrices to be estimated. Innovations have the following characteristics: E(Ut) = 0, 
E(U’tUt) = Σ, and E(U’tUs) = 0 for all t>s. Σ is a constant positive definite variance matrix. 
 
Estimation is carried out using OLS for unrestricted models and SURE when parameter 
restrictions are present. Lag order is selected using Wald and likelihood-ratio tests, as 
well SBIC, HQIC, AIC and final prediction error lag-order selection statistics. Identification 
is conducted in the same way as in the PVAR-X. Our focus are again the COIRFs. The 
respective confidence intervals are estimated using standard errors obtained mainly 
                                                        
22 The proposed MMSC are analogous to the commonly used maximum likelihood-based model-selection 
criteria: the Akaike information criteria (AIC) (Akaike, 1969); the Bayesian information criteria (BIC) 
(Schwarz, 1978; Rissanen, 1978; Akaike, 1977); and the Hannan–Quinn information criteria (HQIC) 
(Hannan and Quinn, 1979). 
23 Hansen’s J statistic tests the correlation between instruments and the error term. 
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from bootstrapped residuals or, seldom, through multivariate-normal parametric 
bootstrapping. Alternatively, confidence-intervals are derived analytically based on the 
asymptotic distribution of the VAR parameters and the cross-equation error variance–
covariance matrix. 
In both econometric approaches, estimation is carried out in first differences, since 
panel unit root and cointegration tests suggest endogenous variables are non-stationary 
and not cointegrated.  
6. RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
6.1 Panel VAR-X Results 
The need to account for central banks asset purchase programmes determines that 
instead of estimating just one panel we divide our group of countries in three panels.  
The first panel is composed by the US, UK, Japan, and Sweden (U2JS), grouping countries 
where central banks conducted government bond purchases. Hence, central bank 
holdings are taken as a sixth endogenous variable. The second panel brings together the 
EA countries in our sample (12 countries), in which case operations and announcements 
dummies24 related to ECB’s asset purchases/monetary policy are used but central bank’s 
holdings remain as an exogenous variable. We treat ECB differently because its actions 
do not react to a single sovereign debt market but take into consideration all country 
members. Even the Securities Markets Programme targeted jointly several countries 
and the concerns transcended monetary policy since the integrity of single currency area 
(or at least the participation of some members) was at stake (Klose & Weigert, 2014; Di 
Cesare et al.,2012). Last, but not the least, we want to ensure comparability with single 
country VAR results for which the previous arguments are more compelling by keeping 
the same approach. The remaining eight countries did not integrate government debt 
purchases in their monetary policy toolkit during the sample period. They form a third 
panel, where central bank’s holdings are treated as an exogenous variable. For each one 
of the panels one just-identified model and two over-identified models are estimated 
for robustness check (Table A - VI). 
6.1.1 Investor Base Impact on Borrowing Costs 
To assess investor base impact on borrowing costs we use yields’25 Cumulative IRF26 to 
a one standard deviation orthogonal shock to each type of investor holdings27. Results 
are presented in Table A - VII to Table A - IX. 
Shocks in foreign bank holdings have a statistically significant impact on 10-years yields, 
a result in line with findings of Manna & Nobili (2018)28. The impact is stronger and more 
                                                        
24 Operations dummies affect the slope of central bank’s holdings and announcement dummies affect the 
intercept of each equation in the system. 
25 In first differences, hence, measured in percentual points. 
26 Responses are measured 4 quarters after the shock unless the response is non-statistically significant 
at the end of 8 quarters, in which case the maximum statistically significant effect is considered. 
27 In first difference of the logarithm of holdings, hence, measured as a percentual change.  
28 In a panel estimation over 16 countries, they find a – 4 bps long-run effect per 1 p.p. of change in foreign 
banks holdings in percent of GDP (see Table A - XIX). 
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persistent in the EA and is also observable on 5-years yields, suggesting this to be a 
feature more pervasive in this bloc of countries linked by a single currency29 and strong 
financial and trade linkages (Lane, 2005). The effects are not statistically significant 
(n.s.s.) or are mixed at the short end of the yield curve.   
Shocks in foreign non-banks have mostly a positive impact on yields and statistical 
significance concentrates in the “Other countries” (OC) panel. In this panel effects are 
significant across the entire yield curve and range between 2 and 4 bps.  
The fact that yields respond in opposite directions when faced with shocks in foreign 
bank and non-bank holdings may explain why Jaramillo & Zhang (2013) and Orspiszewski 
(2015)30 find no significant effect of foreign investors on yields in AE. Andritzky (2012), 
Arslanalp & Poghosyan (2014) and Carvalho & Fidora (2015) find negative effects on 
bond yields but they both include the official sector in their definition of foreign 
investors. Looking at the CDM of official foreign holdings not affected by financial 
assistance programmes 31 , we find consistent and statistically significant negative 
responses of bond yields in the OC panel, and mixed and non-statistically significant 
responses in the U2JS panel. Hence, it seems plausible that previously found yields’ 
negative response to shocks to foreign holdings results from combination of negative 
responses to shocks to different types of investors in each geography. 
Shocks to domestic bank holdings have a heterogeneous impact on yields. In the U2JS 
panel the impact is negative, consistent across the yield curve and mostly persistent. In 
the EA we also find negative yields response, but evidence is less compelling. It is in the 
intermediate and short segments of the yield curve that the effect is clearer. Yields in 
the OC panel respond positively to shocks at the intermediate and short segments of the 
yield curve. In both EA and OC cases the effects are not persistent, lasting at most one 
quarter. Heterogeneity of 10-years yields’ response among panels may explain why 
Jaramillo & Zhang (2013) does not find a statistically significant effect of shocks to 
domestic bank holdings in AE, and why Orspiszewski (2015) and Manna & Nobili (2018) 
find negative effects32 and the results of Andritzky (2012) suggest positive effects.  
Yields respond positively to shocks to domestic non-bank holdings in the U2JS and EA 
panels with the response being again clearer in the former, but also less persistent. The 
response is negative in the OC panel: around -3 bps at 5- and 10-years and stronger at 
2-years. This is the only panel that matches the findings of Andritzky (2012) and Jaramillo 
& Zhang (2013). However, we must remark that the former found no effect in the EA 
and acknowledges that yields response to this type of investor shock fails to come out 
significant in a VAR setting.  
                                                        
29 A single currency promotes a “EA bias” in portfolio allocation, matching the “home bias” also found in 
the US (Burger, et al., 2015).    
30 In regressions of yields’ first differences. Using yields´ levels – found to be stationary in this study – the 
relation is positive.   
31 In the EA statistically significant responses are found mostly at 5-years yields and are positive. 
32 Orspiszewski (2015) and Manna & Nobili (2018) results are both n.s.s. when yields’ first differences are 
used in an alternative specification by the former or in the short-run equation of the ECM by the latter. 




6.1.2 Investors’ Cyclical Behaviour 
We evaluate investors’ cyclical behaviour based on the impulse response functions of 
changes in debt holdings of each type of investors to orthogonal shocks to yields. 
Positive responses mean that investors are net buyers (positive change in holdings) 
when yields go up, that is when prices drop. Hence, a countercyclical behaviour. 
Negative responses indicate a procyclical behaviour, that is investors are net buyers 
when yields fall (prices increase). 
Our results in Table A - X to Table A - XII show foreign investment is procyclical33, but not 
uniform across geographies and investor type. In the U2JS and EA panels statistical 
significance tends to be concentrated on banks, although in the former panel non-banks 
gain statistical relevance as we move down the yield curve. This result confirms the 
procyclical pattern of foreign banks large trades in the EA presented earlier. In the OC 
panel, only foreign non-bank holdings display a statistically significant response to 2- 
and 5-years yields´ shocks, ranging between -2.8% and -3.2%. Andritzky (2012), when 
using a panel VAR approach, and Orspiszewski (2015) also find that lower yields attract 
foreign investors34.  
The cumulative dynamic multipliers (CDM) of the foreign bank holdings regarding global 
risk and international leverage reveal an idiosyncratic feature of the EA: foreign banks 
respond positively to lower global risk and higher international leverage, suggesting 
government debt is traded as a risky asset. In the U2JS panel, foreign banks sell 
government debt when global risk wanes; in the OC panel, foreign banks sell 
government debt when international leverage is buoyant. Foreign non-banks in the EA 
treat sovereign bonds likewise but their reaction is less prevalent, and comparison is 
made difficult by lack of statistically significant responses in other panels.   
Cyclical behaviour of domestic investors is even more heterogeneous. In the EA both 
types of non-official domestic investors exhibit the same procyclical behaviour regarding 
shocks in the upper-median part of the yield curve. In the OC panel the opposite 
behaviour is observed in response to 10-years yields’ shocks, the sole maturity with 
statistically significant effects.  In the U2JS panel, we find bank holdings to respond 
positively to 5-years yields’ shocks but negatively to 2-years yields’ shocks. Non-banks 
only statistically significant response is basically zero.  These results match mixed 
findings in the empirical literature. Andritzky (2012) reports lack of statistically 
significant effects for domestic institutional investors as does Cornand et al. (2014) for 
domestic investors in the period 2008-14, after having found positive responses in the 
years 2002 to 2008. Battistini et al. (2013) point to banks general countercyclical 
behaviour. Although, when yield shocks are decomposed in a common and country 
                                                        
33 This result is agnostic relatively to the causes behind the changes in yields, which could reflect either 
domestic or global factors (the pull and push effects of the empirical literature on capital flows) or a 
combination of both.  
34 Even if the effect is not persistent, as in Andritzky (2012), or only significant post 2007, as in Orspiszewski 
(2015).    
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specific risk factors, responses to country risk by most core countries become procyclical 
whereas they remain countercyclical in most of the periphery. Orspiszewski (2015) and 
Timmer (2018) find lower yields attract banks and investment funds. Orspiszewski (2015) 
finds no statistically significant response from insurance companies and pension funds, 
but Timmer (2018) does.   
Although panel evidence offers some insights, it also reveals a great deal of 
heterogeneity that justifies a closer look at the distribution of responses at country level. 
An important question when studying the relation between sovereign bond yields and 
the dynamics of the ownership structure of public debt is the causality relation, as it can 
go both ways. Granger causality tests provide a way to test whether changes in the 
investor base precede yield changes (“push effect”) or vice versa (“pull effect”). Results 
seem to point to panel- and maturity-specific relationships (see Appendix B). 
Notwithstanding, a few consistent results are: (i) domestic banks Granger-cause 10-
years yields; (ii) the short and intermediate segments of the yield curve are Granger-
caused mostly by domestic investors; (iii) changes in yields precede changes in foreign 
banks holdings and, although less often, also foreign non-banks’ holdings; and (iv) 
domestic banks transactions are Granger-caused mostly by changes at the short and 
intermediate segments of the yield curve. 
6.2 Individual Country VAR-X Results 
6.2.1 Investor Base Impact on Borrowing Costs 
As we have done in the previous section, we assess investor base impact on borrowing 
costs using yields changes’ COIRF35 to a one standard deviation shock to each type of 
investor holdings’ percentual change (see Table A - XIII and Table A - XIV). We further 
combine the different responses of foreign and domestic investors in a 3x3 matrix that 
distinguishes positive, negative, and non-statistically significant responses for banks and 
non-banks.  
Negative yields’ responses to shocks to non-official foreign investor holdings account for 
most of the 47.1% of cases that are statistically significant (Table VII).   
                                                        
35 Responses are measured 4 quarters after the shock unless the response is non-statistically significant 
at the end of 8 quarters, in which case the maximum statistically significant effect is considered. 




FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF YIELDS CUMULATIVE RESPONSE TO ORTHOGONAL SHOCKS TO HOLDINGS 
OF FOREIGN NON-OFFICIAL INVESTORS 
 
Negative responses from yields are mainly associated with GIIPS36 and the US (Figure 
11). The latter case matches the results found for U2JS panel and are in line with findings 
of Beltran et al. (2012) and Warnock & Warnock (2009) for the US. Positive responses 
are associated with just one type of private foreign investors and seem to be a feature 
mainly of safe-haven countries (Japan, Switzerland, or core EA). We must highlight that 
GIIPS and core EA will respond symmetrically to the same foreign investor shock, namely 
a shock to foreign non-banks. In case of a negative shock, outflows prompt higher yields 
in GIIPS and lower yields in core EA. Thus, although the sample period extends 6 years 
after the EA sovereign debt crisis and includes 4 years before it, data does not dismiss 
the possibility of a re-run of GIIPS’s debt refinancing distress.  
In a total of 16 countries with statistically significant yields’ responses, only 50% exhibit 
some degree of consistency of impacts across maturities – Portugal is the single country 
where responses are consistent across all bond maturities. Taking as reference 10-years’ 
responses, we find that only 33% are consistent with 5- and 2-years’ ones, suggesting 
that careful should be exercised in assuming similar impacts along the entire yield curve.  
 
                                                     
36 Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. 




FIGURE 11 - YIELDS CUMULATIVE RESPONSE TO ORTHOGONAL SHOCKS TO HOLDINGS OF  
FOREIGN NON-OFFICIAL INVESTORS 
 
We find no stable relation between overall yields’ response to foreign investment shocks 
and the level of yields, with the exception of 10- and 5-years responses to foreign non-
banks shocks (Figure 12 to Figure 17). However, when negative, yields’ responses seem 
to be stronger in countries associated with higher yields. The strength of response is not 
linearly related with the size of the foreign investor share in total holdings.  
 
FIGURE 12 - 10-YEARS YIELDS RESPONSE TO SHOCKS TO 
FOREIGN BANK HOLDINGS AND LEVEL OF 10-YEARS YIELDS 
 
FIGURE 13 - 10-YEARS YIELDS RESPONSE TO SHOCKS TO 
FOREIGN NON-BANK HOLDINGS AND LEVEL OF 10-YEARS 
YIELDS 
 




FIGURE 14 - 5-YEARS YIELDS RESPONSE TO SHOCKS TO 
FOREIGN BANK HOLDINGS AND LEVEL OF 5-YEARS YIELDS 
 
FIGURE 15 - 5-YEARS YIELDS RESPONSE TO SHOCKS TO 
FOREIGN NON-BANK HOLDINGS AND LEVEL OF 5-YEARS 
YIELDS 
 
FIGURE 16 - 2-YEARS YIELDS RESPONSE TO SHOCKS TO 
FOREIGN BANK HOLDINGS AND LEVEL OF 2-YEARS YIELDS 
FIGURE 17 - 2-YEARS YIELDS RESPONSE TO SHOCKS TO 
FOREIGN NON-BANK HOLDINGS AND LEVEL OF 2-YEARS 
YIELDS 
Source: Author own calculations. Notes: Greece is not included due to the outlier nature of its results. 
 
Yields respond positively to shocks to holdings of domestic non-official investors in 37% 
of cases and positive responses are associated with a diverse group of countries (Table 
VIII).  
TABLE VIII - FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF YIELDS CUMULATIVE RESPONSE TO ORTHOGONAL SHOCKS TO 
HOLDINGS OF DOMESTIC NON-OFFICIAL INVESTORS 
 




FIGURE 18 - YIELDS CUMULATIVE RESPONSE TO ORTHOGONAL SHOCKS TO HOLDINGS OF  
DOMESTIC NON-OFFICIAL INVESTORS 
 
Generally, yields’ response to shocks to the domestic investor base are more consistent 
across the yield curve than responses to shocks to the foreign investor base. Identical 
positive responses across the three maturities are observed in Italy and Spain.  
Consistency regarding the effects of shocks to non-bank holdings is also seen in 
Switzerland, Germany, and the US. In Denmark and Portugal, we also observe 
consistency of positive responses but to shocks to bank holdings. Domestic investor 
shocks are associated with lower borrowing costs mainly in Korea and Austria. Banks are 
also supportive in Ireland, Greece and Norway.  
Asonuma et al. (2015) reports that banks’ home bias generally reduces borrowing costs 
when debt levels are moderate to high. We are unable to confirm this assertion since 
yields response to shocks to domestic banks’ holdings seem unrelated with home bias  
(Figure 19 to Figure 24), defined as an above sample average banks’ share in total 
holdings37. Furthermore, countries with yields’ stronger negative responses38 are found 
across all the distribution of debt levels. No significant relation is observed for non-banks.  
 
                                                     
37 Home bias definition is that of Acharya et al. (2014) and Cornand et al. (2014). Asonuma et al. (2015) 
use instead the ratio of banks’ sovereign claims to bank total assets. 
38 Ireland, Korea, Canada, Austria and UK. 




FIGURE 19 - 10-YEARS YIELDS RESPONSE TO SHOCKS TO 
DOMESTIC BANKS HOLDINGS AND HOME BIAS 
 
FIGURE 20 - 10-YEARS YIELDS RESPONSE TO SHOCKS TO 
DOMESTIC NON-BANKS HOLDINGS AND HOME BIAS 
 
 
FIGURE 21 - 5-YEARS YIELDS RESPONSE TO SHOCKS TO 
DOMESTIC BANKS HOLDINGS AND HOME BIAS 
 
FIGURE 22 - 5-YEARS YIELDS RESPONSE TO SHOCKS TO 
DOMESTIC NON-BANKS HOLDINGS AND HOME BIAS 
 
 
FIGURE 23 - 2-YEARS YIELDS RESPONSE TO SHOCKS TO 
DOMESTIC BANKS HOLDINGS AND HOME BIAS 
 
FIGURE 24 - 2-YEARS YIELDS RESPONSE TO SHOCKS TO 
DOMESTIC NON-BANKS HOLDINGS AND HOME BIAS 
Source: Author own calculations. Blue shaded are indicates above average holdings. 
6.2.2 Investors’ Cyclical Behaviour 
Individual country data support panel evidence that foreign investors tend to exhibit a 
procyclical behaviour, i.e., they are lured to the market by low yields and get out as 
yields inch up. In 42.9% of instances at least one type of foreign investors displays a 
procyclical trading pattern. However, in 20% of the cases foreign investors do lean 
against the wind. Countercyclical responses become more frequent as we move down 
the yield curve. This countercyclical behaviour is not tied down solely to the countries 
belonging to the OC panel. This panel countries often exhibit non statistically significant 
responses to shocks to yields.  
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TABLE IX - FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN NON-OFFICIAL INVESTORS HOLDINGS CUMULATIVE 
RESPONSE TO ORTHOGONAL SHOCKS TO YIELDS 
 
The countries most exposed to foreign investors procyclical responses are GIIPS without 
Italy, small market Nordic countries such as Norway and Sweden and, rather surprisingly, 
the Netherlands.  
 
FIGURE 25 - FOREIGN NON-OFFICIAL INVESTORS HOLDINGS CUMULATIVE RESPONSE TO ORTHOGONAL 
SHOCKS TO YIELDS  
 
In fact, the Netherlands and Portugal are the two single countries that are exposed 
across the entire yield curve to foreign procyclical trading. The US seems to benefit from 
a safe-haven status enjoying lower borrowing costs and foreign investor countercyclical 
behaviour. 
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EA sovereigns subjected to a common shock in interest rates are confronted with 
opposite reactions from foreign investors, facing thereby different refinancing risks. This 
feature may spell future problems, as the lack of a common cause makes political 
agreements aiming at preserving the stability of sovereign debt markets harder to reach. 
Ebeke & Lu (2014) argue that countries with weaker fundamentals tend to suffer more 
from foreign investors procyclical behaviour. The literature lists such fundamental 
factors as economic size, stability of economic growth, breath of domestic investor base 
or investor base concentration, inflation level and volatility, fiscal soundness, and 
external position. We find evidence supporting links to sovereign debt levels39, namely 
for foreign non-banks, to weaker or weakening net international investment positions40, 
and to inflation volatility (Figure 26 to Figure 43 and Appendix B). Typically, these 
relations break-down at the short end of the yield curve.  
 
 
FIGURE 26 - FOREIGN BANKS HOLDINGS RESPONSE TO 
SHOCKS TO 10-YEARS YIELDS AND DEBT-TO-GDP 
 
FIGURE 27 - FOREIGN NON-BANKS HOLDINGS RESPONSE 
TO SHOCKS TO 10-YEARS YIELDS AND DEBT-TO-GDP 
 
 
FIGURE 28 - FOREIGN BANKS HOLDINGS RESPONSE TO 
SHOCKS TO 5-YEARS YIELDS AND DEBT-TO-GDP 
 
FIGURE 29 - FOREIGN NON-BANKS HOLDINGS RESPONSE 
TO SHOCKS TO 5-YEARS YIELDS AND DEBT-TO-GDP 
 
                                                     
39 Variable used to assess fiscal soundness. 
40 We use the net international investment position in 2013 and its change in the period 2013-19 to assess 
the external position. The choice of 2013 aims to guarantee that all data matches the official BPM6-basis 
estimates, avoiding mixing data still using the IMF converted BPM5-basis estimates. 




FIGURE 30 - FOREIGN BANKS HOLDINGS RESPONSE TO 
SHOCKS TO 2-YEARS YIELDS AND DEBT-TO-GDP 
 
FIGURE 31 - FOREIGN NON-BANKS HOLDINGS RESPONSE TO 
SHOCKS TO 2-YEARS YIELDS AND DEBT-TO-GDP 
Source: Author own calculations. Debt-to-GDP mean sample value (2004 Q1 – 2019 Q2). 
 
 
FIGURE 32 - FOREIGN BANKS HOLDINGS RESPONSE TO 
SHOCKS TO 10-YEARS YIELDS AND 2013 NET IIP  
 
FIGURE 33 - FOREIGN NON-BANKS HOLDINGS RESPONSE TO 
SHOCKS TO 5-YEARS YIELDS AND 2013 NET IIP 
 
FIGURE 34 - FOREIGN BANKS HOLDINGS RESPONSE TO 
SHOCKS TO 5-YEARS YIELDS AND 2013 NET IIP FIGURE 35 - FOREIGN NON-BANKS HOLDINGS RESPONSE 
TO SHOCKS TO 5-YEARS YIELDS AND 2013 NET IIP 
FIGURE 36 - FOREIGN BANKS HOLDINGS RESPONSE TO 
SHOCKS TO 2-YEARS YIELDS AND 2013 NET IIP 
 
FIGURE 37 - FOREIGN NON-BANKS HOLDINGS RESPONSE 
TO SHOCKS TO 2-YEARS YIELDS AND 2013 NET IIP 
Source: Author own calculations. Note: IIP – International Investment Position. 




FIGURE 38 - FOREIGN BANKS HOLDINGS RESPONSE TO 
SHOCKS TO 10-YEARS YIELDS AND INFLATION VOLATILITY 
 
FIGURE 39 - FOREIGN NON-BANKS HOLDINGS RESPONSE 
TO SHOCKS TO 10-YEARS YIELDS AND INFLATION VOLATILITY 
 
FIGURE 40 - FOREIGN BANKS HOLDINGS RESPONSE TO 
SHOCKS TO 5-YEARS YIELDS AND INFLATION VOLATILITY 
 
FIGURE 41 - FOREIGN NON-BANKS HOLDINGS RESPONSE 
TO SHOCKS TO 5-YEARS YIELDS AND INFLATION VOLATILITY 
 
FIGURE 42 - FOREIGN BANKS HOLDINGS RESPONSE TO 
SHOCKS TO 2-YEARS YIELDS AND INFLATION VOLATILITY 
 
FIGURE 43 - FOREIGN NON-BANKS HOLDINGS RESPONSE 
TO SHOCKS TO 2-YEARS YIELDS AND INFLATION VOLATILITY 
Source: Author own calculations. Note: IIP – International Investment Position. Change measured 
between 2013 and 2019. 
Individual country data regarding domestic investors’ cyclical behaviour presents a more 
balanced picture. Negative and positive responses carry similar weights (22.9% and 
18.6%, respectively) and in 23% of instances banks and non-banks react symmetrically 
to yield changes. No cyclical trading pattern can be clearly associated to each type of 
domestic investor, although the balance of responses at 5-years suggests a more 
procyclical behaviour by banks at this point of the yield curve. Likewise, the balance of 
responses at 10-years suggests a more countercyclical behaviour by non-banks at this 
maturity. This heterogeneity of results may help explain the mixed results often found 
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TABLE X - FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF DOMESTIC NON-OFFICIAL INVESTORS HOLDINGS CUMULATIVE 
RESPONSE TO ORTHOGONAL SHOCKS TO YIELDS 
 
 
FIGURE 44 - DOMESTIC NON-OFFICIAL INVESTORS HOLDINGS CUMULATIVE RESPONSE TO ORTHOGONAL 
SHOCKS TO YIELDS 
In GIIPS, we see consistent issuer supportive responses by Spanish banks41 and Italian 
and Irish non-banks. In Greece, both types of domestic investors are supportive, but the 
relation only holds briefly and in response solely to changes in 10-years yields. In 
Portugal, we find no significant issuer domestic support. 
                                                        
41 Spanish banks issuer supportive responses echoes findings of countercyclical behaviour by Battistini et 
al. (2013), home bias in GIIPS’ banks by Acharya & Steffen (2015), and redrawing of banks’ sovereign 
portfolios by Lamas & Mencía (2018). Slovenian banks also exhibit positive responses to shocks to 10-
years yields.  
(-) (+) (+)/(-) (-)/(+) n.s.s.
10-years 16.7% 25.0% 8.3% 8.3% 41.7%
5-years 26.1% 26.1% 4.3% 13.0% 30.4%
2-years 13.0% 17.4% 17.4% 17.4% 34.8%
All 18.6% 22.9% 10.0% 12.9% 35.7%
Notes: (-) or (+) indicates response of both types of domestic investor holdings to 
shocks to yields has an equal sign; (-)/(+) or (+)/(-) indicates responses of opposite 
signs; n.s.s. indicates a non-statistically significant response at 5% significance level.
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This set of responses is in line with the results of Cornand et al. (2014) regarding Spain 
and Italy, showing higher yields attract domestic investors. Differently, however, we find 
the same evidence for Ireland, reported to be non-statistically significant, and we do not 
find domestic investor countercyclical behaviour in Portugal. While our shocks to yields 
do not distinguish between common and country specific drivers as in Battistini et al. 
(2013), we do not find neither a common response by EA banks, nor a distinction 
between responses in core and periphery. For instances, Spanish and Italian banks 
consistently across the yield curve exhibit exactly opposite cyclical behaviours.   
The supportive role of Spanish banks at all points of the yield curve and the intertwin of 
sovereign and banking risk suggest a greater role for non-banks in Spain. The absence of 
any domestic support in Portugal, the country most consistently exposed to foreign 
investors across the entire yield curve, also points in the same direction. In core EA, 
banks in France, the Netherlands and in a lesser degree in Austria are consistently 
procyclical. The same applies to non-banks in France and Germany, but only in response 
to shocks to 5- and 2-years yields. 
Outside the EA, we also find consistent cyclical support from banks in Canada and 
Sweden, highlighting the fact that this feature is not exclusive of GIIPS. Non-banks 
countercyclical behaviour is observed in Czechia, Korea, and the US. 
Is there a relation between domestic investor responses and home bias? If higher yields 
at the intermediate and short end of the yield curve seem to have some attraction to 
banks with an above average holdings of sovereign debt, different cyclical responses 
within the non-bank sector may explain why the same relation does not hold for this 
type of investors (Figure 45 to Figure 50). Home bias may help to reduce sovereign debt 
refinancing risk and make a default less likely, but its association exclusively to banks 
risks reinforcing the sovereign-banks nexus and put further downward pressure on 
prices if other investors perceive a deterioration in their expected losses in case of 
default. 




FIGURE 45 - DOMESTIC BANKS HOLDINGS RESPONSE TO 
SHOCKS TO 10-YEARS YIELDS AND HOME BIAS 
 
FIGURE 46 - DOMESTIC NON-BANKS HOLDINGS RESPONSE 
TO SHOCKS TO 10-YEARS YIELDS AND HOME BIAS 
 
FIGURE 47 - DOMESTIC BANKS HOLDINGS RESPONSE TO 
SHOCKS TO 5-YEARS YIELDS AND HOME BIAS 
 
FIGURE 48 - DOMESTIC NON-BANKS HOLDINGS RESPONSE 
TO SHOCKS TO 5-YEARS YIELDS AND HOME BIAS 
 
FIGURE 49 - DOMESTIC BANKS HOLDINGS RESPONSE TO 
SHOCKS TO 2-YEARS YIELDS AND HOME BIAS 
 
FIGURE 50 - DOMESTIC NON-BANKS HOLDINGS RESPONSE 
TO SHOCKS TO 2-YEARS YIELDS AND HOME BIAS 
Source: Author own calculations. Blue shaded are indicates above average holdings. 
 
Individual country Granger causality Wald tests’ results (see Appendix B). point to a 
balanced bi-directional causality between sovereign bond yields and the investor base. 
Panel evidence that domestic banks Granger-cause 10-years yields is confirmed. In fact, 
domestic banks and foreign non-banks are the investor sectors that most Granger-cause 
5- and 10-years yields. Domestic non-banks become relevant at the short-end of the 
yield curve – a result also observed at panel-level – but the two previous investor sectors 
continue to play a significant role. On the other hand, foreign banks seem to matter only 
at the long end. 
Regarding pull-effects, yields precede changes in holdings mostly for domestic investors, 
namely at the short end of the yield curve. Foreign bank holdings are Granger-caused 
particularly by 5-years yields. 
 





The paper assesses the impact of different types of investors on government borrowing 
costs and examine how those investors react to shocks in sovereign bond yields, using 
an approach that recognizes bi-directional causality, encompasses different types of 
foreign and domestic non-official investors, and covers different bond maturities.  
Despite advanced economies’ capital markets integration, our econometric study 
confirms descriptive statistical analysis evidence suggesting a strong degree of 
heterogeneity of the sovereign debt investor base across countries and reveals that this 
heterogeneity also applies across points of the yield curve.  Thus, debt management 
offices have all the advantage in developing a deeper knowledge of their respective 
investor base behaviour.  
Notwithstanding, our empirical results allow us to identify some commonalities. Foreign 
investment, mostly by banks, is associated with lower borrowing costs, a feature more 
pervasive at the long and intermediate segments of the yield curve and in the EA. When 
negative, yields’ responses to shocks to foreign holdings seem to be stronger when yield 
levels are higher. Yields respond negatively to shocks to foreign holdings in GIIPS and in 
the US and positively in safe-haven countries such as core EA, Switzerland, or Japan. 
Hence, in case of a negative shock across the EA, we may see again a widening in spreads. 
Generally, across the yield curve, yields’ response to shocks to the domestic investor 
base are more consistent than to shocks to the foreign investor base. Yields responses 
are mainly positive and seem to bear no significant relation with home bias.   
Foreign investors, namely banks, often display a procyclical trading pattern. Foreign 
investors return-seeking seems to be stronger where fundamentals such as inflation 
volatility, sovereign debt levels or net international investment position are weaker. 
Countercyclical behaviour also occurs but tends to be more common at the short end of 
the yield curve.   
Foreign investment in the EA is comparatively more procyclical. Another idiosyncrasy of 
the EA relates to foreign banks negative response to global risk and positive response to 
international leverage, leading sovereign debt to be traded more like a risky than a safe 
asset. A negative shock to these global factors, prompting foreign selling, leaves the EA 
exposed to wider spreads, potentially reinforced by procyclical trading. In turn, a 
widening spiral in bond yield spreads risks debasing investor beliefs regarding debt 
sustainability. Hence, most exposed countries to foreign investors must remain 
attentive in avoiding doubts over their debt and external position sustainability and the 
EA ought to keep operational an effective support mechanism to mitigate investor 
concerns, deter contagion and prevent an escalation that may jeopardize the monetary 
union itself. 
Individual country data regarding domestic investors’ cyclical behaviour presents a more 
even picture. No cyclical trading pattern can be clearly associated to each type of 
domestic investor, despite hints of procyclical banks at 5-years and countercyclical non-
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banks at 10-years. Home bias seems weakly linked to stronger countercyclical responses 
by banks at the intermediate and short end of the yield curve but not by non-banks. The 
issuer supportive role of Spanish banks at all points of the yield curve and the intertwin 
of sovereign and banking risk suggest a greater role for non-banks in Spain. The absence 
of any domestic issuer support in Portugal, the country most consistently exposed to 
foreign investors across the entire yield curve, also points in the same direction. 
The empirical analysis could be extended in several ways. In what concerns data, the use 
of expectations could be expanded, and the country panel enlarged to emerging 
markets. In terms of econometric framework, allowing for parameter heterogeneity in 
PVAR estimation and using a regime switching VAR, eventually over a simplified model, 
to improve the modelling of central bank holdings’ structural breaks. Furthermore, 
cross-country linkages may be better addressed by a Global VAR approach. Another 
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TABLE A - I - SOVEREIGN DEBT INVESTOR BASE COUNTRY LIST 
# Advanced Economies Country Codes 
1 Australia AUS 
2 Austria AUT 
3 Belgium BEL 
4 Canada CAN 
5 Czech Republic CZE 
6 Denmark DNK 
7 Finland FIN 
8 France FRA 
9 Germany DEU 
10 Greece GRC 
11 Ireland IRL 
12 Italy ITA 
13 Japan JPN 
14 Korea KOR 
15 Netherlands NLD 
16 New Zealand NZL 
17 Norway NOR 
18 Portugal PRT 
19 Slovenia SVN 
20 Spain ESP 
21 Sweden SWE 
22 Switzerland CHE 
23 United Kingdom GBR 

























Bank Assets IMF Monetary and Financial Statistics, 
Bank of Canada, Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand, Swiss National Bank, Bank of 
England
IMF - Other Depository Corporations; Canada - Chartered Banks Assets; N. Zealand 
- Registered Banks Assets; Switzerland - Domestic Assets of Swiss Banks; U.K. -
Banks and Building Socities Assets.
Bank Credit to Private Non-Financial Sector BIS
Banks’ Claims on the General Government IMF Monetary and Financial Statistics, 
Bank of Canada, Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand, Swiss National Bank, Bank of 
England
IMF - Claims on Central Government and Claims on State & Local Government; 
Canada - G.G. Loans and Securities; N. Zealand - Government Securities and 
Claims by Sector – Government Administration & Defence; Switzerland - Public 
Sector; U.K. -Claims on Public Sector.
Current Account OECD and IMF 
GDP OECD and IMF 
General Government Budget Balance and Gross Debt to GDP Eurostat, OECD and IMF Exceptions are: Australia - Budget Balance sourced from Australia Statistics; 
Canada - Budget Balance sourced from Canada Statistics; New Zealand, both 
variables retrieved from NZ Statistics; Switzerland - Budget Balance souced from 
Swiss Federal Finance Administration
Government bond yields (quarterly averages) Bloomberg, Datastream, and OECD series OECD series is used only for 10-years yields. For Greece and Ireland 3-years yields 
are used instead of 2-years yields due to data availability. 
Holdings of general government gross debt IMF, sovereign investor base estimates by 
Arslanalp & Tsuda (2014).
Holdings of general government gross debt are defined as the consolidated sum of 
liabilities represented by SDRs, currency and deposits, debt securities and loans, 
at face value or adjusted for valuation changes to remove price fluctuations. 
Saving certificates and retail bonds, typically a small share of total debt in most 
AE, are accounted for under currency and deposits. General government 
encompasses central government, state and local governments and social security 
funds
ICE BofA US High Yield Index Option-Adjusted Spread Ice Data Indices, LLC; retrieved from FRED, 
Federal Reserve Bank St. Louis
ICE BofAML US Corporate AAA and BBB Option-Adjusted 
Spread vs Treasury
Ice Data Indices, LLC; retrieved from FRED, 
Federal Reserve Bank St. Louis
Inflation OECD and IMF 
Inflation Expectations 5 years forward Federal Reserve Bank St. Louis U.S. only.
Maturity of Government Debt (average) OECD Sovereign Borrowing Outlook 2004, 
2007, 2013, 2016, and 2019 and annual 
data from the Greek Debt Management 
Agency
The data is for central government debt, but we assume the same data for the 
entire general government debt due to the lack of data on the latter's average 
maturity. Linear interpolations are used to bring the year end data to a quarterly 
frequency considering the high persistence of this type of data. Sweden, 
Switzerland, and United Kingdom are the only AE for which we have no data prior 
2007. To fil this gap we assume no change for the period 2004Q4 to 2007Q4. 
OECD Leading Indicator OECD; retrieved from FRED, Federal 
Reserve Bank St. Louis
Canada only.
Share Price Return OECD; retrieved from FRED, Federal 
Reserve Bank St. Louis
U.S. and Switzerland only.
Short-term interest rates and policy rates OECD and IMF Japan 3-month BBA Libor is an exception and is sourced from the ECB 
VIX Index Bloomberg VIX Index is the Chicago Board Options Exchange’s Market Volatility Index, a 
measure of constant 30-day expected volatility of the U.S. stock market, derived 
from real-time, mid-quote prices of call and put options on the S&P 500
Country Type Description Period Interaction Variables Models
Asset Purchase Programme 2010 Q4 - 2012 Q1 Intercept All All
Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing 2013 Q2 - 2016 Q2 Intercept All All
QQE with Yield Curve Control 2016 Q3 - 2019Q2 Intercept All All
SB 2014 Q2 2014 Q2 Intercept Foreign Non-Official 10- and 5-years
Data
2017 Q3 - data uses fixed weights for foreign 
banks and non-banks holdings
2017 Q3 - 2019 Q2 Intercept Foreign Non-Official All
U.K. APP
Asset Purchase Facility (effective net purchase 
periods)
2009 Q2 - 2010 Q3; 
2011 Q3 - 2012 Q3; 





APP Quantitative Easing Indicator
2009 Q2 - 2009 Q4; 
2010 Q4 - 2011 Q2; 
2013 Q1 - 2013 Q4
Intercept All All
SB 2013 Q1 2013 Q1 Intercept Foreign Non-Banks All
SB 2014 Q3 - 2015 Q4 2014 Q3 - 2015 Q4 Intercept Foreign Non-Official All
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TABLE A -  IV - DUMMY VARIABLES FOR EURO AREA 
 
 
Country Type Description Period Interaction Variables Models
Austria APP PSPP Operations 2015 Q1 - 2018 Q4 Slope All All
PSPP Operations 2015 Q1 - 2018 Q4 Slope All All
CBPP1 Announcement 2009 Q2 Intercept All 2-years
OMT Announcement 2012 Q3 Intercept All 5-years
PSPP Annoucement 2015 Q1 Intercept All 10-years
Fin Ass New legal text of the ESM Treaty 2012 Q1 Intercept All All
PSPP Operations 2015 Q1 - 2018 Q4 Slope All 10-years
CBPP1 Announcement 2009 Q2 Intercept Foreign Banks, Yields All
SMP1 Announcement 2010 Q2 Intercept Foreign Banks, Yields 2-years
PSPP Expectations 2014 Q3 - 2014 Q4 Intercept Domestic Banks All
PSPP Duration 2015 Q1 - 2018 Q4 Intercept Foreign Banks 5-years
PSPP Operations 2015 Q1 - 2018 Q4 Slope All 10-years
CBPP1 Announcement 2009 Q2 Intercept All All
SMP1, LTRO1, LTRO2 and OMT Annoucements
2010 Q2, 2011 Q4, 2012 
Q1, 2012 Q3
Intercept All All
PSPP Annoucement, PSPP increase in monthly 
pace to 80bn
2015 Q1, 2016 Q1 Intercept All 2- and 5-years
PSPP Operations 2015 Q1 - 2018 Q4 Slope All
SMP1, SMP2, PSPP Annoucements
2010 Q2, 2011 Q3, 
2015Q1
Intercept
Greece APP SMP1 Operations 2010 Q2 - 2011 Q2 Slope
Restr Debt Restructuring 2012 Q1 Intercept
SMP1 Operations 2010 Q2 - 2011 Q2 Slope All 10-years
PSPP Operations 2015 Q1 - 2018 Q4 Slope All 2- and 5-years








SMP2 Announcement 2011 Q3 Intercept Foriegn Banks, Yields 5 years
LTRO1 Announcement 2011 Q4 Intercept All 10 years
LTRO2 Allotment date 2012 Q1 Intercept Yields 2- and 5-years
SMP2 Announcement 2011 Q3 Intercept Foreign Banks, Yields 5 years
OMT Announcement 2012 Q3 Intercept
Domestic Non-Banks, 
Yields 5-years
PSPP Expectations 2014 Q3 - 2014 Q4 Intercept
Foreign Banks, Domestic 
Non-Banks
2- and 5-years
PSPP Annoucement 2015 Q1 Intercept
Foreign Banks, Domestic 
Non-Banks
2- and 5-years
Fin Ass Finacial Assistance Period 2010 Q4 - 2013 Q4 Intercept All All
Fin Ass Post Financial Assistance 2014 Q1 Intercept Foreign Banks (2Y) All
APP Post PSPP period 2019 Q1 Intercept Domestic Non-Banks (2Y) All
PSPP Operations 2015 Q1 - 2018 Q4 Slope All All
LTRO2 Allotment date 2012 Q1 Intercept All All
PSPP Annoucement 2015 Q1 Intercept All 10-years
Data Reclassification of domestic banks holdings 2006 Q3; 2007 Q4 Intercept All All
CBPP1 Announcement 2009 Q2 Domestic Banks, Yields 10-years
SMP1 Announcement 2010 Q2 Domestic Non-Banks All
SMP2 Announcement 2011 Q3 Domestic Banks 10-years
OMT Announcement 2012 Q3 Foreign Non-Official, Yields All
PSPP Expectations 2014 Q3 - 2014 Q4 Domestic Banks, Yields 10-years
PSPP Duration 2015 Q1 - 2018 Q4 All All
PSPP Annoucement, PSPP increase in monthly 
pace to 80bn
2016 Q4 Foreign Non-Banks
All
Data 2016 Q3, 2019 Q2 2016 Q3, 2019 Q2 Intercept Foreign Non-Official All
SMP1 Operations 2010 Q2 - 2011 Q2 Slope All 10-years
PSPP Operations 2015 Q1 - 2018 Q4 Slope All 2- and 5-years
SMP1 Announcement 2010 Q2 Intercept
Domestic Non-Banks, 
Foreign Banks 2- and 5-years
LTRO1 Announcement 2011 Q4 Intercept Domestic Banks All
LTRO2 Allotment date 2012 Q1 Intercept Yields 2-years
OMT Announcement 2012 Q3 Intercept Yields 5-years
PSPP Annoucement 2015 Q1 Intercept Foreign Banks, Yields All
Fin Ass Finacial Assistance Period 2010 Q4 - 2013 Q4 Intercept Foreign Banks All
APP LTRO1 Announcement 2011 Q4 Intercept All
APP OMT Announcement 2012 Q3 Intercept Yields
APP PSPP Expectations 2014 Q3 - 2014 Q4 Intercept Domestic Banks
APP PSPP Annoucement 2015 Q1 Intercept
Foreign Banks, Doestic 
Non-Banks, Yields
2005Q3, Euro replaces Tolar 2005Q3, 2007 Q1 Intercept Foreign Non-Official
2015 Q2 2015 Q2 Intercept
Domestic Non-Banks, 
Yields
2016 Q3 2016 Q3 Intercept Domestic Non-Banks
2016 Q4 2016 Q4 Intercept
Foreign Banks, Doestic 
Non-Banks
2019 Q2 2019 Q2 Intercept Domestic Non-Banks
PSPP Operations 2015 Q1 - 2018 Q4 Slope All
LTRO1 Announcement 2011 Q4 Intercept Foreign Banks
LTRO2 Allotment date 2012 Q1 Intercept
Foreign Non-Banks, 
Domestic-Banks, Yields
OMT Announcement 2012 Q3 Intercept
Foreign Banks, Domestic 
Banks
PSPP Expectations 2014 Q3 - 2014 Q4 Intercept
Foreign Non-Official, 
Domestic Banks
Fin Ass Beginning of Financial Assistance Period 2012 Q4 Intercept All but Foreign Banks























2- and 5-yearsDomestic Banks
APP
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TABLE A - V - DUMMY VARIABLES FOR OTHER COUNTRIES 
 
 
TABLE A - VI - PVAR-X MODELS 
 
 
TABLE A - VII - 10-YEARS YIELD CHANGE RESPONSE TO A ONE STANDARD DEVIATION SHOCK TO EACH 
TYPE OF INVESTOR HOLDINGS’ PERCENTUAL CHANGE 
 
Country Type Description Period Interaction Variables Models
Australia Data
2008 Q1, 2008 Q3, 2009 Q1, 2009 Q2 - data 
outliers






 2 Structural Break Points under the 
Innovational Outlier Scheme 
2017 Q1, 2017 Q3, 2018 
Q2 Intercept Domestic Non-Official All
Denmark SB  2 Structural Break Points under the 
Innovational Outlier Scheme 
2015 Q4, 2016 Q2, 2016 
Q3, 2016 Q4, 2017 Q4, 
2018 Q1 Intercept Foreign Non-banks All
Korea -
APP US QE2 - Quantitative Easing Spillover Effects 2010 Q3 - 2011 Q2 Intercept All All
APP Post - EA PSPP Announcement 2015 Q1 - 2019 Q2 Intercept All 10-years
2010 Q4 2010 Q4 Intercept Domestic Non-Banks All
2011 Q1 2011 Q1 Intercept Domestic Non-Banks All
2014Q1-2014 Q3 2014Q1-2014 Q3 Intercept Foreign Banks 2-years
Pre - EA PSPP Announcement (2 Quarters) 2014 Q3 - 2014 Q4 Intercept Foreign Non-Banks 5-years
Post - EA PSPP Announcement ( 2 Quarters) 2015 Q1 - 2015 Q2 Intercept Foreign Non-Banks 5-years
APP Bank Reserve Expansion Announcement 2011 Q3 Intercept All All
2008 Q1 2008 Q1 Intercept Domestic Non-Official All
2015 Q4 2015 Q4 Intercept Domestic Non-Official All








Endog. Var. Instruments Hansen J p-value Endog. Var. Instruments Hansen J p-value Endog. Var. Instruments Hansen J p-value
3 3 - 3 3 - - 3 3 - -
1 3 67.84 0.617 1 3 58.33 0.878 1 3 70.94 0.513
1 2 42.13 0.223 1 2 39.23 0.327 1 2 42.22 0.220
3 3 - 3 3 - - 3 3 - -
1 4 84.91 0.203 1 4 87.19 0.159 1 4 79.65 0.335
1 3 59.67 0.164 1 3 56.66 0.240 1 3 51.05 0.432
4 4 - 3 3 - - 3 3 - -
1 4 67.13 0.730 1 4 62.86 0.840 1 4 65.97 0.762
1 2 18.25 0.831 1 2 19.05 0.795 2 4 44.76 0.683
Lags Lags







Notes: For each panel, the first row describes the just-identified model and the second and third rows the overidentified models. All models do not reject 









Foreign Foreign Domestic Domestic
Endog. Var. Instruments Banks Qtr Non-banks Qtr Banks Qtr Non-banks Qtr
US/GB/JP/SW
3 3 -0.03 ** 0 0.00 - -0.06 ** - 0.06 ** 1
1 3 -0.02 - 0.03 - -0.11 ** - 0.06 ** -
1 2 -0.02 - 0.01 - -0.12 ** - 0.04 ** 0
Euro Area
3 3 0.10 - 0.15 - 0.08 ** 2 0.06 ** 1
1 4 -0.12 ** - 0.04 ** 0 -0.12 ** 0 0.10 ** -
1 3 -0.15 ** - 0.04 - 0.06 ** 1 0.11 ** -
Other countries
4 4 -0.04 ** 4 0.03 ** 2 0.00 - -0.04 ** 3
1 4 0.00 - 0.03 ** - 0.02 - -0.03 ** -
1 2 0.00 - 0.02 - 0.02 - -0.01 -
Lags
Note: The asterisks ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The change in yields 
response to a one standard deviation shock in the percentual change in holdings of each type of investor is measured 
in percentual points. Hence, -0.03 means -3 basis points. It is measured four quarters after the shock if it persists 
significant at least 8 quarters. Otherwise the maximum impact is reported and its date is printed in"Qtr".
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TABLE A - VIII - 5-YEARS YIELD CHANGE RESPONSE TO A ONE STANDARD DEVIATION SHOCK TO EACH 




TABLE A - IX - 2-YEARS YIELD CHANGE RESPONSE TO A ONE STANDARD DEVIATION SHOCK TO EACH TYPE 




Foreign Foreign Domestic Domestic
Endog. Var. Instruments Banks Qtr Non-banks Qtr Banks Qtr Non-banks Qtr
US/GB/JP/SW
3 3 0.00 - 0.01 - -0.08 ** 1 0.08 ** 2
1 3 -0.01 - 0.04 - -0.17 ** - 0.05 ** 0
1 2 0.00 - 0.01 - -0.16 ** - 0.04 ** 0
Euro Area
3 3 -0.17 ** 1 0.30 - -0.10 * 1 -0.25 -
1 4 -0.27 ** - 0.01 - -0.07 - -0.11 -
1 3 -0.34 ** - 0.03 - -0.14 - -0.05 -
Other countries
3 3 0.01 - 0.03 ** 1 0.03 ** 1 -0.01 -
1 4 0.00 - 0.04 ** - 0.01 - -0.03 * -
1 2 0.00 - 0.03 ** - 0.03 * 1 0.00 -
Note: The asterisks ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The change in yields 
response to a one standard deviation shock in the percentual change in holdings of each type of investor is measured 
in percentual points. Hence, -0.03 means -3 basis points. It is measured four quarters after the shock if it persists 
significant at least 8 quarters. Otherwise the maximum impact is reported and its date is printed in"Qtr".
Lags
2 Years
Foreign Foreign Domestic Domestic
Endog. Var. Instruments Banks Qtr Non-banks Qtr Banks Qtr Non-banks Qtr
US/GB/JP/SW
3 3 0.01 - 0.03 - -0.08 ** 1 0.07 ** 1
1 3 0.00 - -0.01 - -0.13 ** - 0.03 ** 0
1 2 0.01 - -0.01 - -0.15 ** - 0.05 -
Euro Area
3 3 0.01 - 0.02 - 0.04 - 0.00 -
1 4 0.02 - -0.01 - -0.03 * 0 0.05 ** -
1 3 0.00 - 0.03 * 0 -0.01 - 0.07 ** -
Other countries
3 3 0.02 * 2 0.03 ** 2 0.02 - -0.01 -
1 4 0.00 - 0.02 ** 1 0.03 ** 1 -0.12 ** -
2 4 -0.01 * 2 0.02 - 0.03 ** - -0.05 ** -
Lags
Note: The asterisks ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The change in yields 
response to a one standard deviation shock in the percentual change in holdings of each type of investor is measured 
in percentual points. Hence, -0.03 means -3 basis points. It is measured four quarters after the shock if it persists 
significant at least 8 quarters. Otherwise the maximum impact is reported and its date is printed in"Qtr".
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TABLE A - X - INVESTOR HOLDINGS PERCENTUAL CHANGE RESPONSE TO ONE STANDARD DEVIATION 
SHOCK TO 10-YEARS YIELDS 
 
 
TABLE A - XI - INVESTOR HOLDINGS PERCENTUAL CHANGE RESPONSE TO ONE STANDARD DEVIATION 
SHOCK TO 5-YEARS YIELDS 
 
 
Foreign Foreign Domestic Domestic
Endog. Var. Instruments Banks Qtr Non-banks Qtr Banks Qtr Non-banks Qtr
US/GB/JP/SW
3 3 -0.044 ** - -0.021 - -0.003 - 0.001 -
1 3 -0.016 ** - -0.023 - -0.003 - 0.000 -
1 2 -0.021 ** - -0.019 ** - -0.005 - 0.000 -
Euro Area
3 3 -0.013 - -0.005 - -0.006 - 0.005 -
1 4 -0.027 ** - 0.003 - -0.005 - -0.016 ** 2
1 3 -0.038 ** - 0.012 - -0.009 ** - -0.023 ** -
Other countries
4 4 0.000 - -0.032 - 0.019 ** 2 0.004 ** 1
1 4 0.005 - -0.008 - 0.007 - 0.003 -
1 2 0.008 - -0.002 - 0.010 - 0.004 -
Note: The asterisks ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The 
percentual change in holdings response to a one standard deviation shock in yields is measured in units. 
Hence, -0.04 means -4%. It is measured four quarters after the shock if it persists significant at least 8 
quarters. Otherwise the maximum impact is reported and its date is printed in"Qtr".
Lags
Foreign Foreign Domestic Domestic
Endog. Var. Instruments Banks Qtr Non-banks Qtr Banks Qtr Non-banks Qtr
US/GB/JP/SW
3 3 -0.025 ** 1 -0.039 ** 2 0.028 * 2 0.001 -
1 3 -0.023 ** - -0.032 ** - -0.009 - 0.000 ** -
1 2 -0.029 ** - -0.040 - -0.015 - -0.001 -
Euro Area
3 3 -0.035 ** 2 -0.001 - -0.023 ** 4 -0.015 ** 2
1 4 -0.047 ** - -0.021 - -0.020 - -0.006 -
1 3 -0.051 ** - -0.018 ** - -0.020 ** - -0.008 -
Other countries
3 3 0.014 - -0.020 * 1 0.004 0.004 -
1 4 0.004 - -0.018 * - 0.004 - 0.002 -
1 2 0.008 - -0.012 - 0.007 - 0.003 -
Lags
Note: The asterisks ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The 
percentual change in holdings response to a one standard deviation shock in yields is measured in units. 
Hence, -0.04 means -4%. It is measured four quarters after the shock if it persists significant at least 8 
quarters. Otherwise the maximum impact is reported and its date is printed in"Qtr".
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TABLE A - XII - INVESTOR HOLDINGS PERCENTUAL CHANGE RESPONSE TO ONE STANDARD DEVIATION 
SHOCK TO 2-YEARS YIELDS 
 
 
TABLE A - XIII - YIELDS RESPONSE TO AN ORTHOGONAL SHOCK TO NON-OFFICIAL FOREIGN HOLDINGS OF 
GOVERNMENT DEBT 
 
Foreign Foreign Domestic Domestic
Endog. Var. Instruments Banks Qtr Non-banks Qtr Banks Qtr Non-banks Qtr
US/GB/JP/SW
3 3 -0.073 ** 5 -0.052 * 2 0.018 - 0.013 -
1 3 -0.016 ** 1 -0.051 ** - -0.048 ** - -0.003 -
1 2 -0.016 ** 2 -0.056 ** - -0.029 ** 1 0.003 -
Euro Area
3 3 -0.007 ** 1 0.005 - 0.008 - -0.001 -
1 4 -0.006 * - -0.001 - -0.003 - -0.006 -
1 3 -0.010 ** 0 0.004 - -0.005 - 0.001 -
Other countries
3 3 0.003 - -0.031 ** 1 -0.002 - 0.003 -
1 4 -0.002 - -0.022 ** 0.003 - 0.000 -
1 2 -0.004 - -0.032 ** 0.001 - 0.004 -
Lags
Note: The asterisks ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The 
percentual change in holdings response to a one standard deviation shock in yields is measured in units. 
Hence, -0.04 means -4%. It is measured four quarters after the shock if it persists significant at least 8 
quarters. Otherwise the maximum impact is reported and its date is printed in"Qtr".
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TABLE A - XIV  - YIELDS RESPONSE TO AN ORTHOGONAL SHOCK TO NON-OFFICIAL DOMESTIC HOLDINGS 
OF GOVERNMENT DEBT 
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TABLE A - XV - RESPONSE OF NON-OFFICIAL FOREIGN HOLDINGS OF GOVERNMENT DEBT TO AN 
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TABLE A - XVI - RESPONSE OF NON-OFFICIAL DOMESTIC HOLDINGS OF GOVERNMENT DEBT TO AN 
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TABLE A - XVII - SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE USING PERCENTUAL CHANGE IN HOLDINGS 
 
TABLE A - XVIII - SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE USING INVESTOR SHARE IN TOTAL HOLDINGS 
 
TABLE A - XIX - SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE USING INVESTOR HOLDINGS IN PERCENTAGE OF 
GDP 
 
TABLE A -  XX - SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE USING HOLDINGS’ LEVELS 
 
Study Dep. Variables Sample Period Methodology Findings
Orpiszewski (2015) Yields (10-years) Pooled OLS, Country FE Yields relate  (+) with Δ%NOFH and (-) with Δ%DBH. 
ΔYields (10-years) Both Δ%NOFH and Δ%DBH nss.
Panel Arellano-Bond 
GMM estimator  
All types of holdings are nss.
Δ% Holdings 2001 Q1-2011 Q4 25-27 AE, EM Pooled OLS, Country FE NOFH relates (-)  with yields and Δyields post 2007 Q1. Pre 2007 
Q1, relates (+) with yields and relation with Δyields is nss..
DBH relates (-) with yields and Δyields post 2007 Q1. Pre 2007 Q1, 
relation in both cases is nss.
IF relates (-) with Δyields, and is nss with yields. ICPF only pre 
2007 Q1 relation with yields is ss and is zero.
Timmer (2018) Price returns 2005 Q4-2014 Q4 - - Pooled OLS, Security and 
Time  FE
Price returns relate (+) with Δ Bank and IF Holdings in previous 
quarter and relation is nss regarding ICPF Holdings. After 3-6 or 6-
8 quarters prices of securities bought respectively by Banks and 
IF fall, and fall  by more than the initial increase. Prices of 
securities bought by ICPF increase after 10-12 quarters.
Δ% Holdings 
Security j
Bank and IF Holdings relate (-)  with previous quarter returns.
ICPF's Holdings relate (+)  with previous quarter return.
Notes: Δyields - Yields first differences; Δ% Holdings - Percentual change in Holdings;  FE - Fixed Effects; (n)ss - (not) statistically significant; Δ%NOFH - Percentual Change in 
Non-Official Foreign Holdings; DBH - Domestic Bank Holdings; IF - Investment Funds; ICPF - Insurance Companies and Pension Funds.
Countries
AE, EM18
Study Dep. Variables Sample Methodology Findings
Peiris (2010) Yields 2000 Q1  2009 Q1 10 EM Pooled OLS Yields relate (-) with FH share (-6 bps)
Andritzky (2012) Yields (10-years) 1969-2011 9-11 AE Pooled OLS Yields relate (-) with FH share (-3 bps; -4bps for period 2000-11)
Yields relate (-) with DNBH share (-2.6 bps)
Yields (10-years) PVAR, 3 lags, 90% CI, 
MC(200) Yields response to shocks to investor holdings is nss in all cases
Holdings Share FH share instantaneous response to shocks to yields -0.2, nss 
thereafter. DNBH response is nss.
Arslanalp & Poghosyan 
(2014)
Yields (10-years) 2004 - 2012 22 AE Pooled OLS, Country FE Yields relate (-) with FH share (-8.5 bps)
Ebeke & Lu (2014) Yields (5-years) 2009 Q1 - 2013 Q1 12 EM Pooled OLS, Country FE Yields relate (-) with FH share (-6.8 bps)
Pooled 2SLS IV Yields relate (-) with FH share (-3.9 bps)
Countries
Notes: CI - Confidence Interval; MC(200) - 200 Monte Carlo replications; FE - Fixed Effects; IV - Instrumental Variables; FH - Foreign Holdings; DNBH - Domestic Non-Bank 
Holdings
Study Dep. Variables Sample Methodology Findings
Jaramillo & Zhang 
(2013)
Yields (10-years) 2004 H1 - 2012 H2 40 AE, EM Hausman-Taylor Model Yields relate (-) with FBH%GDP but relation is nss.
Yields relate (+) with DBH%GDP but relation is nss. Separately, 
AE and EM present (-) relation also nss.
Yields relate (-) with DNBH%GDP (-3.3 bps; -3bps AE only).
Yields relate (+) with ECB SMP holdings(%GDP) and IMF 
programme countries 
Manna & Nobili (2018) Yields (10-years) 2004 Q1 - 2016 Q2 16 AE PECM -CCE LR Yields relate (-) with FBH%GDP (-4 bps) in the LR.
Yields relate (-) with DBH%GDP (-3 bps) in the LR.
Yields relate (-) with FNBH%GDP but relation is nss in the LR.
ΔYields (10-years) PECM - PMG SR Yields relate (-) with ΔFBH%GDP (-9 bps) in the SR.
Yields relate (-) with ΔFNBH%GDP (-4 bps) in the SR.
Yields relation with ΔDBH%GDP is nil and nss in the SR.
Yields relate (-) with ΔDFNBH%GDP but is nss in the SR.
Notes: PECM - Panel Error Correction Model; CCEP - Common Correlated Effect estimator (Pesaran, 2006); PMG - Pooled Mean Group estimator (Pesaran et al., 1999); LR - long-
run equation; SR - short-run equation; (+) positive; (-) negative; nss - not statistically significant; FBH%GDP - Foreign Bank  Holdings in percentage of GDP; FNBH - Foreign Non-
Bank Holdings; DBH - Domestic Bank Holdings; DNBH - Domestic Non-Bank Holdings; ΔFBH%GDP - Foreign Bank Holdings in percentage of GDP first differences.
Countries
Study Dep. Variables Sample Methodology Findings
Battistini et al. (2013) Bank Holdings 2008 Oct - 2012 
Aug
10 AE VECM DBH respond (+) to shocks to yield differentials, in all countries 
but three. In Belgium, France and the Netherlands the response 
is (-). Decomposing yield shocks in a common risk factor and a 
country risk factor, the relation is mostly (+) to the former but 
differs considerably to the latter: in core countries (except 
Austria), an increase in country risk prompts local banks to 
reduce significantly their domestic exposures and to increase in 
the periphery (except for Spain, where the effect is positive but 
nss).
Yield Differentials Yield differentials respond (-) to shocks to DBH, except Spain, 
Italy and Germany. In Spain and Italy the reponse is (+) 
suggesting government bank bailout concerns.
Notes: VECM - Vector Error Correction Model; (+) positive; (-) negative; nss - not statistically significant; DBH - Domestic Bank Holdings. 
Countries
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